

The Acquisition of Endesa by Gas Natural: Why the Antitrust Authorities are Right to Be Cautious

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Abstract-

In the electricity sector the use of merger remedies is a risky game to play. To protect consumers, economics suggests that merger controls be more cautious and stringent than in other sectors. It is better to risk being wrong in prohibiting a merger or imposing severe procompetitive remedies than to risk being wrong in approving a merger with possibly ineffective remedies.

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